

Curriculum Vitae

1. Personal Data

Name in Hebrew: ד"ר רובינצ'יק אנה
Name in English: Anna Rubinchik, Ph.D.
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2. Education Certificates and Degrees

Education	Institute	Department	From - To
B.A. in Computer Science and Economics	Tel-Aviv University, Israel	Economics	1991-1995
Ph.D. in Economics	University of Pennsylvania, USA	Economics	1995-2001

3. Title of Doctoral Thesis:

Three Essays on Economics of Federalism

Supervisor: Prof. Andrew Postlewaite

4. Academic Ranks

Rank	From - To	Institute
Senior Lecturer with tenure	2014-present	University of Haifa, Israel; Economics

5. Supervision of Graduate Students

a. M.A. Students

Name of Student	Year of Completion	Co-Supervisor
Raafat Ali-Saleh	Introducing Competition in Israeli Cement Industry	None
Tomer Salama	The effect of property tax structure on the issuance of building permits for residential use in Israel	None

b. doctoral Students

Name of Student	Year of Completion	Co-Supervisor	Date of Completion	Student's Achievements
Mariya Burdina	Candidates' Polarisation, Campaign Strategies and Issue Importance	None	2010	Associate Professor, University of Central Oklahoma in Oklahoma City
David Pinto Quintero	Three Essays in Political Economy	Prof. Murat Iyigun	2010	Administrative Director at Grupo THEOS in Mexico City, Mexico
Watcharapong Ratisukpimol	The Economics of Modern Maritime Piracy	Prof. Murat Iyigun	2011	Lecturer at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, Thailand
Joyce Chia-Heng Loh	Economic Conditions for Democratisation	Prof. Martin Boileau	2012	Assistant Professor at the National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan
Labib Shami	Dynamic Monetary Equilibrium with Non-Observed Economy and Shapley and Shubik's Price Mechanism	Prof. Nissim Cohen	2018	Lecturer at the Western Galilee College

c. Member of the dissertation committee for Ph.D. students

(Year of completion is in brackets.) Seo Seung (2003), Valeriy Gauzshtein (2004), Ming He (2004), Ji Guo (2004), Kremena Platikanova (2006), Kiyoshi Yonemoto (2006), Katherine Sauer (2006), Nikolay Dobrinov (2010), Said Boakye (2008), Hesham Al-Ogeel (2008), Grzegorz Pac (2008), Avishay Aiche (2015).

6. Grants and Awards

Year	Name
1991-1992	International Scholarship Foundation Charity Trust Scholarship
Summer 1992	International Scholarship Foundation Charity Trust award for an environmental project
1995-2000	University of Pennsylvania Fellowship
1998	Joel Popkin Graduate Student Teaching Prize in Economics
2002	National Tax Foundation Best Dissertation Award, a finalist
2011	Award for Research Support, University of Haifa
2019	Research Fellowship, Yale University, USA
2019	Chateaubriand fellowship, Paris, France

7. Active Participation in Conferences

Dec 2001 ASSA Meetings; Graduate Student Invited Session New Orleans, LA;

June 2002 CORE, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium “The Political Integration and Disintegration” conference;

July 2002 Association for Public Economic Theory Conference (APET) Paris;

March 2003 Public Choice Society Meetings Nashville, TN;

June 2003 APET Duke, NC;

July 2003 Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Rodos, Greece;

August 2003 Econometric Society European Meetings (ESEM) Stockholm, Sweden;

March 2004 Public Choice Society Meetings Baltimore, MD;

July 2004 Second World Congress of the Game Theory Society Marseille, France;

June 2005 APET Marseilles, France;

June 2005 Canadian Economic Theory (CET) Vancouver, Canada;

July 2005 International Game Theory Festival Stony Brook, NY;

August 2005 Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, section: Public and Private Sector Contracting, Stanford USA;

May 2006 Intergenerational Equity in Climate Negotiations, Overlapping Generations Models and Social Welfare CORE, LLN, Belgium;

July 2006 International Game Theory Festival Stony Brook, NY;

Summer 2006 Econometric Society Meetings Minneapolis, MN;

June 2007 SAET Kos, Greece;

June 2007 CET Montreal, Canada;

July 2007 APET Vanderbilt University, TN;

July 2008 Society for Economic Dynamics Boston, MA ;

July 2008 APET Seoul, South Korea;

June 2011 A tribute in honour of C. d’Aspremont and J.-F. Mertens LLN, Belgium; June 2011 SAET Faro, Portugal;

August 2011 ESEM Oslo, Norway;

October 2011 NSF/NBER/CEME Conference on General Equilibrium, Iowa City, Iowa;

December 2011 Economic Theory Conference, The University of Kansas Lawrence, KS;
 August 2012 ESEM Malaga;
 February 2013 Society for Benefit-Cost Analysis 2013 conference Washington, DC, USA; July
 2013 SAET Paris, France;
 August 2014 SAET Tokyo, Japan;
 July 2015 Stony Brook Game Theory Fest, SUNY, NY, USA;
 July 2016 SAET and Public Economic Theory Conferences, Rio-de-Janeiro, Brazil; July
 2016 International Game Theory Congress, Maastricht, Netherlands;
 June 2017, 2018, 2019 Summer Workshop in Economic Theory, Paris, France;
 July 2017 SAET Faro, Portugal;
 August 2017 IFORS, Quebec, Canada;
 D-TEA 2018, Paris;
 SAET 2018, Taipei; 2019 Ischia
 European Workshop in General Equilibrium Theory, 2018, Paris; 2019, Berlin
 December 2019, Time Uncertainties Strategies VI Conference, Paris

8. Active Participation in Conferences (Only from 2001)

Date	Name of the Conference	Place	Subject of Lecture	Role
Dec 2001	ASSA Meetings; Graduate Student Invited Session	New Orleans, LA	Can Decentralization be Beneficial?	Presenter
June 2002	“The Political Integration and Disintegration” conference	CORE, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium	Can Decentralisation Be Beneficial?	Presenter
July 2002	Association for Public Economic Theory Conference (APET)	Paris, France	Anarchy, State, Paretopia : demand for the Nozickian minimal state	Presenter
March 2003	Public Choice Society Meetings	Nashville, TN	Anarchy, State, Paretopia: Demand for the Minimal State	Presenter, Discus sant
June 2003	APET	Duke, NC	Why are Some Taxes 'More Equal than Others' ?	Presenter
July 2003	Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET)	Rodos, Greece	Composition of spending and the architecture of a cabinet	Presenter
August 2003	Econometric Society European Meetings (ESEM)	Stockholm Sweden	Anarchy, State, Paretopia: Demand for the Minimal State	Presenter
March	Public Choice	Baltimore,	Composition of	Presenter,

Date	Name of the Conference	Place	Subject of Lecture	Role
2004	Society Meetings	MD	Public Spending and the Architecture of a Cabinet	Discus sant
July 2004	Second World Congress of the Game Theory Society	Marseille, France	Implementability of Reforms and Human Rights	Presenter
June 2005	APET	Marseilles, France	Demand for Contract Enforcement and Gains from Trade	Presenter
June 2005	Canadian Economic Theory (CET)	Vancouver, Canada	Does it Take a Tyrant to Implement a Good Reform?	Presenter
July 2005	International Game Theory Festival	Stony Brook, NY	Does it Take a Tyrant to Implement a Good Reform?	Presenter
August 2005	Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, section: Public and Private Sector Contracting	Stanford, CA	Ideological Divide within the Cabinet and Public Spending	Presenter, Discus sant
May 2006	Intergenerational Equity in Climate Negotiations, Overlapping Generations Models and Social Welfare	CORE, LLN, Belgium	Intergenerational equity and the discount rate for cost-benefit analysis	Invited Lecture
July 2008	Society for Economic Dynamics	Boston, MA	Intergenerational equity and the discount rate for cost-benefit analysis	Presenter
July 2008	APET	Seoul, South Korea	Regularity and stability of equilibria in an overlapping generations model with exogenous growth	Presenter and session chairman
June 2011	A tribute in honour of C. d'Aspremont and J.-F. Mertens	LLN, Belgium	Regularity and stability of equilibria in an overlapping generations model with exogenous growth	Presenter

Date	Name of the Conference	Place	Subject of Lecture	Role
June 2011	SAET	Faro, Portugal	Optimal Diversity Mix For Contests	Presenter
August 2011	ESEM	Oslo, Norway	Equilibria in overlapping generations model with transfer policies and exogenous growth	Presenter
February 2013	Society for Benefit-Cost Analysis 2013 conference	Washington, DC, USA	Discounting and welfare evaluation of policies	Presenter
July 2013	SAET	Paris, France	Welfare evaluation of policies in an overlapping generations growth model	Presenter
August 2014	SAET	Tokyo, Japan	The Frame of memory	Presenter
February 2015	The International Workshop on Decision Making, Game Theory and Epistemic Logic	Brisbane, Australia	Interplay between Cognitive and Impulsive Components in Decision Making	Presenter
July 2015	International Conference on Game Theory	Stony Brook, NY, USA	Impulsive decisions: nature or nurture? Stochastic Approximation Approach	Presenter
July 2016	SAET and Public Economic Theory Conferences	Rio-de-Janeiro, Brazil	Contemplation vs. intuition. A reinforcement learning perspective	Presenter
July 2016	International Game Theory Congress	Maastricht, Netherlands	Contemplation vs. intuition. A reinforcement learning perspective	Presenter
June 2017	Summer Workshop in Economic Theory	Paris, France	Regularity and stability of equilibria in an overlapping generations model with exogenous growth	Presenter

Date	Name of the Conference	Place	Subject of Lecture	Role
July 2017	SAET	Faro, Portugal	Ex-Ante Heterogeneity in All-Pay Many-Player Auctions with Pareto Distribution of Costs	Presenter
August 2017	IFORS	Quebec, Canada	Regularity of a general equilibrium in a model with infinite past and future	Presenter and Session Organizer
May 2018	D-TEA	HPC Paris	Animal learning in a multidimensional discrimination task as explained by dimension-specific allocation of attention	Presenter
2018	SAET	Taipei, Taiwan	Animal learning in a multidimensional discrimination task as explained by dimension-specific allocation of attention	Presenter
2019	SAET	Ischia, Italy	Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Determinacy of Asymptotically Stationary Equilibria in OLG model	Presenter
2018	European Workshop in General Equilibrium Theory	Paris	Regularity of a general equilibrium in a model with infinite past and future	Presenter
2019	European Workshop in General Equilibrium Theory	Berlin	Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Determinacy of Asymptotically Stationary Equilibria in OLG model	Presenter
December 2019	Time Uncertainties Strategies VI Conference	Paris	Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Determinacy of Asymptotically Stationary Equilibria in OLG model	Presenter

9. Positions Held

From-To	Institute	Position
2001-2009	University of Colorado, Boulder, USA; Economics and Philosophy	Assistant Professor
2003, 2005, 2010, 2012	CORE, UCL, Belgium	Visiting Scholar
06/2001 and 02/2004	Center for European Integration, (ZEI), Bonn, Germany	Visiting Scholar
09/2012	Universite Paris Dauphine, Paris, France	Visiting Professor
2009-2014	University of Haifa, Israel; Economics	Lecturer
2014-2020	University of Haifa, Israel; Economics	Senior Lecturer with tenure
1/2015	University of Queensland, Australia	Visiting Scholar
Fall 2018	University of Colorado at Boulder	Visiting Professor
Spring 2019	Yale University, Cowles Foundation	Visiting Fellow
June 2019	Paris I (Chateaubriand fellowship)	Visiting Professor

10. Additional Professional Experience

1995: Programmer, Aurec Group, Ramat Gan, Israel.

11. Scientific Areas of Specialization

Economic Theory, Public Economics, Neuroeconomics

12. Miscellaneous

Refereeing for Academic Journals

American Economic Review Journal of Economic Theory Journal of Regional Science
Economics and Philosophy European Union Politics Journal of Public Economics

Theoretical Economics Social Choice and Welfare Games and Economic Behaviour
International Economic Review European Economic Review Journal of Development
Economics Economics Letters Economic Theory Econometrica

Mathematical Social Sciences Canadian Journal of Economics Macroeconomic Dynamics

Courses Taught in Recent Years

Microeconomic Theory (B.A. and Ph.D.), Public Economics (B.A. and Ph.D.), Operations
Research (B.A.), Decisions and Markets under Uncertainty (B.A.).

13. Academic Profile

13.1 Policy Evaluation in Overlapping Generations (OLG) Models.

This is a joint work with Jean-Francois Mertens¹ and, further, with Alexander Gorokhovsky of University of Colorado, Boulder, USA.

Key public policy decisions involve transfers across generations. How big a deficit

Before he passed away in 2012, Prof. Mertens was a member of CORE, Louvain-la-Neuve,¹ Belgium.

can we run today that benefits current generations and will leave future ones to top the bill? Should we tax current working population to pay the benefits to the current retirees? These questions require there being a clear trade-off between resources today and tomorrow, called the social discount rate. There are many reasons to believe that this rate should be different from the interest rate that is used to calculate the net present value of private projects. However, not all economists would agree with this statement. How should we choose this rate? This was the key question posed by Sir Nicholas Stern at the start of the millennium. Our first project was directed at formulating foundations for the choice of an intergenerationally fair social discount rate for public projects in a model that involves overlapping generations of agents. Surprisingly, we supported Stern's answer, but for a different reason.

13.1.1 Intergenerational Equity and Cost-Benefit Analysis

The goal of the joint work is to link a welfare evaluation of a reform that an economist would be required to do and a common practice of cost-benefit analysis. We wish to identify when these two approaches will lead to the same calculation and thereby determine a social discount rate that is consistent with a welfare evaluation of policies done under a well-defined social objective (welfare) function. More precisely, we ask when the derivative of a social welfare function with respect to a perturbation of a policy has a static and a dynamic component, with the latter being an exponential function of time. The key requirement that we identify — time-invariance — can be easily satisfied. Take for example, a OLG economy with exogenous growth at a locally unique equilibrium, which is a balanced growth path.

We demonstrate that in such an economy relative utilitarian welfare function implies the discount rate should equal the growth rate of real per-capita consumption (2-2.5% for the U.S.). Indeed, as labor becomes more productive and the economy grows, consumption becomes cheaper at the rate of productivity growth, and thus has to be discounted at this rate, if we are to treat all generations equally. The traditional utilitarian approach prescribes a higher discount rate for a society populated by individuals with identical preferences, with a wide range of possible values; besides, with heterogeneous preferences the discount rate is not well-defined, as this welfare function shifts more weight on the least risk averse individuals with the progression of time.

In a related work (*Discounting and Welfare Evaluation of Policies*), we show that discounting as an approximation to welfare requires stationarity of the baseline equilibrium and that imposing evaluation at current prices (e.g., using interest rate as the discount rate) requires the welfare weights (for different generations) to depend on the price system and hence the inter-generationally fair discount rate is typically distinct from the prevailing interest rate, even in an efficient equilibrium.²

These results were presented at the meetings of the Society for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Washington DC in 2013 which gather both academics and practitioners from government offices such as Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Transportation and others.

13.1.2 Regularity

The next step was to validate the assumptions of the above analysis. The seemingly “technical” issue of existence of the derivative of a welfare function in OLG models became the center of my research for more than a decade. The culprit was the question whether one can calculate a first-order approximation to a response of an equilibrium (capital, consumption, etc) to a small policy change, i.e., whether “comparative statics” is possible at some baseline equilibrium. The “good” equilibria where such policy assessment is possible are sometimes referred to as *regular* equilibria. There were no clear answers in the literature, but the overall attitude towards these

We provide, in [Pareto Optimality of the Golden Rule equilibrium in Overlapping Generations² Model with Production and Transfers], a short proof of Pareto efficiency of a golden rule equilibrium path (where the output of consumption is the highest, keeping the capital stock constant over time, with all quantities adjusted for growth).

models was somewhat pessimistic. Although they are most suitable to analyse a variety of policies: from pension reforms to environmental regulations, the hidden “technical” difficulties that might invalidate comparative statics, turned many economists away, towards simpler, representative agent models, thus limiting the scope of adequate policy analysis. A systematic approach was called for.

We started with mathematical foundations (*Essential properties of $L_{p,q}$ spaces (the amalgams) and the implicit function theorem for equilibrium analysis in continuous time*) that extended some known results and prepared the tool box for the analysis of regularity of equilibria in the spirit of Debreu who analysed similar questions in a simpler, finite, economy in the 1970s.

The next step was to characterise stationary equilibria of the overlapping generations model with production and variable life-time productivity in continuous time (*Equilibria in an overlapping generations model with transfer policies and exogenous growth*). We extended results (by D. Gale) previously established for exchange economies only (without production) which clarify the role of money in these models. In addition, we found that, surprisingly, oddity properties of equilibria depend on intricate features of life-cycle productivity and that inefficiently high level of investment can arise in equilibrium as a result of a permanent transfer into the economy.

Now we were ready for the first attack at regularity using a fully parameterised model of the type we analysed before. There [*Regularity and stability of equilibria in an overlapping generations model with exogenous growth*] we showed, that for almost all parametrizations, comparative statics is possible.

Using a more general model and a different, more general approach, now with A. Gorokhovsky, in *Regularity of a general equilibrium in a model with infinite past and future*, we showed that regularity prevails for almost all policy instruments/transfers. Surprisingly, the key condition used in this paper was time-invariance, much like the assumption made in the paper that started this whole investigation (*Intergenerational Equity and the Discount Rate for Policy Analysis*). Hence for a large class of models the foundations for the derived social discount rate are valid without any additional assumptions. Moreover, in the process of working on these papers it became clear that there should be a direct way to calculate policy responses, i.e., to perform the comparative statics itself.

There still remained a gap between our findings and a “common wisdom” prevailing in the literature claiming that comparative statics can not be applied generically in OLG models. A. Gorokhovsky and I decided to eliminate all possible “technical” differences between our model and the ones where such results were established. We picked a simple discrete time OLG model with a few types of agents and worked on a clear indicator that should tell an analyst whether at a given equilibrium comparative statics is possible. Our goal is to contrast models with truncated past (and infinite future) with the models where time extends infinitely both into the future and into the past and thus where perfect foresight is possible. We show that in the first case the conditions required to enable comparative statics are more restrictive than in the second case, if the evaluation is done at a stationary equilibrium. Further, we illustrate our results with an example and show how to perform (in that simple case) the comparative statics when our indicator shows that it is possible, thus also challenging the existing approach. We hope to eliminate the confusion that prevailed in the literature since the mid 1980’s. This is a work in progress, revision is requested by the *Journal of Economic Theory*.

13.2 Policy Evaluation

To the best of my knowledge the existing approach to evaluating the reaction of equilibrium variables to small changes in policy (reforms) in overlapping generations models is based on the idea of an “impulse response” and is done mainly computationally (e.g., Does Social Security Privatization Produce Efficiency Gains? Shinichi Nishiyama and Kent Smetters *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* (2007)). In an on-going project with A. Gorokhovsky and L. Shami we develop an analytical algorithm that allows one to calculate the effect of a change in policy not

only following its enaction (as in “impulse response”) but also in *anticipation* of it.

13.3 Economic Effects of Money Laundering

The recent surge in unobserved economic activity has given rise to massive movements of proceeds across the world. In response, several international organizations were formed to combat money laundering. Some of the related policies have somewhat unexpected effects. We discuss one of them in the recent paper *Towards a Cashless Economy: Economic and Socio-Political implications* with N. Cohen and L. Shami.

Several related questions, including ways to measure and identify money laundering are the subject of future and on-going projects.

13.4 Neuroeconomics and reinforcement learning

Animal learning in a multidimensional discrimination task as explained by dimension-specific allocation of attention with Genela Morris and Flavia Aluisi: Reinforcement learning describes the process by which during a series of trial-and-error attempts, actions that culminate in reward are strengthened. When the actions are based on sensory stimuli, an association is formed between the stimulus, the action and the reward. Computational, behavioral and neurobiological accounts of this process successfully explain simple stimulus response learning. However, if the cue is multi-dimensional, identifying which of its features are relevant for the reward is not trivial, and the underlying cognitive process is poorly understood. To study this we adapted an intra-dimensional/ extra-dimensional set-shifting paradigm to train rodents on a multidimensional sensory discrimination task. In our setup, stimuli of different modalities (spatial, olfactory and visual) are combined into complex cues and manipulated independently. In each set, only a single stimulus dimension is relevant for reward. To distinguish between learning and decision-making we suggest a weighted attention model (WAM). It combines a learning model where each feature-dimension is reinforced separately with a decision rule that chooses an alternative according to a weighted average of learnt values, in which weight is associated with each dimension. We estimated the parameters of the WAM (decision weights, learning rate and noise) and demonstrated that it outperforms an alternative model in which a value learnt is assigned to each combination of features, or every state. Estimated decision weights of WAM reveal an experience-based bias in learning. The intra-dimensional set shift separated the decision weights. While in the first phase of the experiment the weights were roughly the same, in the second phase the weight on the dimension that was key to finding the reward became higher than others. After the extra-dimensional shift this dimension became irrelevant, however its decision weight remained high for the early learning stage in this last phase, providing an explanation for the poor performance of the animals. By the end of the phase when the rats performance improved, the weights for the two dimensions converged. Thus, estimated weights can be viewed as a possible way to quantify the experience-based bias.

Contemplation vs. intuition. A reinforcement learning perspective. With In-Koo Cho: In a search for a positive model of decision-making with observable primitives, we rely on the burgeoning literature in cognitive neuroscience to construct a three-element machine (agent). Its control unit initiates either impulsive or cognitive elements to solve a problem in a stationary Markov environment, the element chosen depends on whether the problem is mundane or novel, memory of past successes, and the strength of inhibition. Our predictions are based on a stationary asymptotic distribution of the memory, which, depending on the parameters, can generate different “characters”, e.g., an uptight dimwit, who could succeed more often with less inhibition, as well as a laid-back wise-guy, who could gain more with a stronger inhibition of impulsive (intuitive) responses. As one would expect, stronger inhibition and lower cognitive costs increase the frequency of decisions made by the cognitive element. More surprisingly, increasing the “carrot” and reducing the “stick” (being in a more supportive environment) enhance contemplative decisions (made by the cognitive unit) for an alert agent, i.e., the one who identifies novel problems frequently enough.

13.5 Social Choice

In the paper *The rarity of consistent aggregators*, with E. Baharad and Z. Neeman, we re-visit the celebrated “doctrinal paradox”. Common assessments based on judges' opinions might

depend on the order of aggregation. Opinions express degree of belief or conviction about propositions. To get a common opinion one aggregates across propositions and then across individuals. Alternatively, one might first aggregate across individuals. If the results in the two cases are different, we have the “doctrinal paradox”.

Such a paradox is not a rare exception. We show that the set of opinion aggregators immune to the paradox is meagre. Linear aggregators and a few others are immune to the paradox.

13.6 Games

In a series of papers (*Contests with Heterogeneous Agents, Ex-Ante Heterogeneity in AllPay Many-Player Auctions with Pareto Distribution of Costs* with Sergio O. Parreiras we study the equilibria of contests where all players invest an effort and only the owner of the highest investment wins. The key difficulty is in assuming that players observe some differences among their rivals, but neither can precisely identify the abilities of the others. (The literature up until then focused on two or several ex-ante identical players). In this case, the stronger players might shy away from the contest altogether, just because they are perceived as weak by their rivals at the outset and sufficiently risk averse players will adopt the “all-or-nothing” strategies facing risk-neutral rivals.

In the paper *The asymptotic core, nucleolus and Shapley value of smooth market games with symmetric large players*, with A. Aiche and B. Shitovitz we extend several commonly used cooperative solution notions to R. Aumann’s world with the ocean of small players and a few big ones, thus offering another perspective on evaluating “market power”.

13.7 Political Economy

These papers are older: I have not worked in this area for a few years and I do not expect to come to these topics in the near future. *Demand For Contract Enforcement in A Barter Environment*, with Roberto M. Samaniego; *A Note on Redistributive Fairness and Economic Reform*, with Ruqu Wang; *Ideological Divide within the Cabinet and Public Spending; Existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in a model of spatial electoral competition with entry*, with Shlomo Weber; *Can decentralization be beneficial?*; *An Inquiry into the Efficiency of Water Projects under WRDA86*.

Publications

Anna Rubinchik, Ph.D.

A. Published

1. Rubinchik, Anna. "An Inquiry into the Efficiency of Water Projects under WRDA '86". In: *International Tax and Public Finance* 11, 2004, pp. 741-762.
2. Rubinchik, Anna. "Can Decentralization Be Beneficial?" In: *Journal of Public Economics* 89(7), 2005, pp. 1231-1249.
3. Rubinchik, Anna and Shlomo Weber. "Existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in a model of spatial electoral competition with entry". In: *Advances in Mathematical Economics* 10, 2007, pp. 109-119.
4. Rubinchik, Anna. "Composition of Spending and the Architecture of a Cabinet". In: *Journal of Public Economic Theory* 10(6), 2008, pp. 1069-1083.
5. Rubinchik, Anna and Ruqu Wang. "A Note on Redistributive Fairness and Economic Reform". In: *Journal of Development Economics* 86, 2008, pp. 447-452.
6. Sergio O. Parreiras and Rubinchik, Anna. "Contests with Three or More Heterogeneous Agents". In: *Games and Economic Behavior* 68(2), 2010, pp. 703-715.
7. Jean-Francois Mertens and Rubinchik, Anna. "Intergenerational equity and the discount rate for policy analysis". In: *Macroeconomic Dynamics* 16(1), 2012, pp. 61-93.
8. Rubinchik, Anna and Roberto M. Samaniego. "Demand for Contract Enforcement in a Barter Environment". In: *Social Choice and Welfare* 41(1), 2013, pp. 73-97.
9. Jean-Francois Mertens and Rubinchik, Anna. "Equilibria in an overlapping generations model with transfer policies and exogenous growth". In: *Economic Theory* 54(3), 2013, pp. 537-595.
10. Jean-Francois Mertens and Rubinchik, Anna. "Essential properties of $L_{p,q}$ spaces (the amalgams) and the implicit function theorem for equilibrium analysis in continuous time". In: *Journal of Mathematical Economics* 50, 2014, pp. 187-196.
11. Jean-Francois Mertens and Rubinchik, Anna. "Pareto Optimality of the Golden Rule equilibrium in Overlapping Generations Model with Production and Transfers". In: *Macroeconomic Dynamics* 19(8), 2015, pp. 1780-1799.
12. Avishay Aiche, Benyamin Shitovitz, and Rubinchik, Anna. "The asymptotic core, nucleolus and Shapley value of smooth market games with symmetric large players". In: *International Journal of Game Theory* 44(1), 2015, pp. 135-151.
2017. Jean-Francois Mertens and Rubinchik, Anna. "Regularity and stability of equilibria in an overlapping generations growth model". In: *Macroeconomic Dynamics*, 2017. Published online: 17 July 2017, pp. 1-31. DOI: 10.1017/S1365100516001334.
13. In-Koo Cho and Anna Rubinchik. "Contemplation vs. intuition: a reinforcement learning perspective". In: *EURO Journal on Decision Processes* 5(1), Nov. 2017, pp. 141-167. DOI: 10.1007/s40070-017-0068-x.
14. Jean-Francois Mertens and Rubinchik, Anna. "Discounting and welfare evaluation of policies". In: *Journal of Public Economic Theory* 19(5), 2017, pp. 903-920. DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12266.
15. Alexander Gorokhovskiy and Anna Rubinchik. "Regularity of a general equilibrium in a model with infinite past and future". In: *Journal of Mathematical Economics* 74, 2018, pp. 35-45. DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.10.006. URL: <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406817301210>.
16. Flavia Aluisi, Anna Rubinchik, and Genela Morris. "Animal learning in a multi-dimensional discrimination task as explained by dimension-specific allocation of attention". In: *Frontiers of Neuroscience, section Decision Neuroscience*, June 2018. DOI: 10.3389/fnins.2018.00356.
17. Sergio O. Parreiras and Rubinchik, Anna. "Ex-Ante Heterogeneity in All-Pay Many-Player

Auctions with Pareto Distribution of Costs”. In: *Economic Theory*, 2019.

18. Nissim Cohen, Anna Rubinchik, and Labib Shami. “Towards a Cashless Economy: Economic and Socio-Political implications”. In: *European Journal of Political Economy* 61, 2020.

B. Accepted

19. Eyal Baharad, Zvika Neeman, and Rubinchik, Anna. “Aggregation of Opinions is Hard”. In: *Mathematical Social Sciences*, forthcoming.